Aristotle the Art of Rhetoric Translation and Index by W Rhys Roberts

ARISTOTLE'South Art of Rhetoric

ARISTOTLE'S

Art of Rhetoric

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TRANSLATED AND WITH AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY Past ROBERT C. BARTLETT

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The University of Chicago Press

CHICAGO AND LONDON

The University of Chicago Printing, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

© 2019 by The Academy of Chicago

All rights reserved. No part of this book may exist used or reproduced in any fashion whatsoever without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations in critical articles and reviews. For more information, contact the University of Chicago Press, 1427 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637.

Published 2019

Printed in the United States of America

28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 1 2 3 iv 5

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-59162-9 (cloth)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-59176-6 (east-book)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226591766.001.0001

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Aristotle, author. | Bartlett, Robert C., 1964– translator, author of added commentary.

Title: Aristotle's art of rhetoric / translated and with an interpretive essay by Robert C. Bartlett.

Other titles: Rhetoric. English language (Bartlett) | Art of rhetoric

Description: Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018025296 | ISBN 9780226591629 (textile : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780226591766 (e-book)

Subjects: LCSH: Rhetoric—Early works to 1800. | Philosophy, Ancient—Early Works to 1800.

Classification: LCC PA3893 .R313 2018 | DDC 808.v—dc23

LC record bachelor at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018025296

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Newspaper).

CONTENTS

Preface

Overview of the Art of Rhetoric

Bibliography

Listing of Abbreviations

Art of Rhetoric

OUTLINE OF BOOK one

BOOK one

OUTLINE OF BOOK ii

BOOK 2

OUTLINE OF Book 3

BOOK iii

Interpretive Essay

Glossary

Key Greek Terms

Authors and Works Cited

Proper Names

Full general Index

PREFACE

The chief purpose of the nowadays volume is to encourage serious report of the art of rhetoric, by way of a render to its origins in Aristotle. The political importance of rhetoric is clear enough: for republican government to function, citizens must be able to stand up before their fellows, limited themselves clearly, and persuade a sufficient number of them that this policy, that treaty, these laws, should be approved or condemned. Hence the histories of the cracking republics supply us with impressive examples of political rhetoric—Thucydides' War of the Peloponnesians and Athenians above all—just as do the leading republican or democratic statesmen, Pericles, Cicero, Abraham Lincoln, and Winston Churchill amid them.

The fate of rhetoric in our time is uncertain. Afterwards a long menses of seeming fail or indifference, rhetoric has in recent decades begun to attract attention in one case again. To track this ascent, autumn, and revival of rhetoric in any detail would be a great undertaking. Perhaps it will suffice to sketch some of the primary developments. To brainstorm at the very kickoff, the art of rhetoric seems to take been built-in in Greek antiquity.¹ And in the leading philosophical circles in that location, rhetoric was thought to be a necessary supplement to public life because the truth is of limited political use, every community being a Cave that will remain more than or less untouched past the lord's day's low-cal. Information technology would ever fall to persuasive rhetoric, so, to bridge the chasm betwixt impotent truth and stiff opinion, wherever brute forcefulness did not simply dictate the field. The relatively high condition of rhetoric every bit a subject of study endured, with some inevitable peaks and valleys, in the long menses stretching from Greek and Roman artifact—Isocrates and Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian—through the Middle Ages. As one-third of the trivium, rhetoric was regarded as a necessary part of a sound liberal education, together with grammer and logic (or dialectic). This loftier status of rhetoric began to falter with the advent of the modern Enlightenment, when rhetoric came to be regarded, or at any charge per unit presented, as an unnecessary nuisance and even a danger.² For in the bright light bandage by scientific reason, invigorated by its novel method, mere persuasion came to exist viewed as the relic of a benighted historic period.

Crucial to the demotion of rhetoric, and of Aristotelian rhetoric especially, was the assault on the early modern university led most notably by Thomas Hobbes.³ The university was at its core Scholastic, and Hobbes'due south attack on it took aim at both elements of Scholasticism—Christianity, of course, but Aristotle as well: And since the authority of Aristotle is only current in that location [in the university], that study is not properly philosophy . . . simply Aristotelity. "And I believe that scarce annihilation tin can be more than absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more than ignorantly than a great part of his Ethics."⁴

It is true that Hobbes omits from this listing of bad books Aristotle's Rhetoric,⁵ which Hobbes had studied carefully and fruitfully: his account of the passions, central to his political philosophy, is to a considerable degree indebted to Aristotle's own account in the Rhetoric.⁶ As the printer of the 1681 edition of Hobbes's Works put it, in a preface to Hobbes's painstaking translation or paraphrase of the Rhetoric (A Briefe of the Fine art of Rhetorique, 1637), Mr. Hobbes chose to recommend by his translation the rhetoric of Aristotle, as being the almost accomplished work on that field of study which the world has yet seen; having been admired in all ages, and in particular highly canonical by the begetter of the Roman eloquence [i.east., Cicero], a very competent estimate.⁷ Nevertheless, Hobbes declined the opportunity to praise Aristotle's Fine art of Rhetoric, in part because he came to come across the need to set on the rhetoric he had inherited. That the very set on on classical rhetoric was not without its own rhetoric does not undo the fact of the attack.⁸ With the discovery of an altogether new moral science or of a political science finally deserving of that proper name, it seemed that the need for the troublesome rhetoric of old would somewhen fade away, together with the repugnant and ignorant political philosophy that accompanied it. Not only the foundation of all government, just also the regular acquit of it, would for the get-go time in human history exist guided past the calorie-free of reason (public reason). A new understanding of popular sovereignty and the consultation of the law or laws of nature, for example, would help dislodge antique rhetoric, which as well often gave ability to the eloquent as distinguished from the prudent or just—what Hobbes decried equally the aristocracy of orators.⁹ If many of the political speeches that survive from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dazzle the states with their elaborate eloquence and erudition, especially every bit compared to the utterances, bodily or electronic, of our politicians today, information technology notwithstanding seems true that the fine art of rhetoric fell into some disfavor and desuetude as the Enlightenment advanced.¹⁰

Only when doubts about the modern projection began to be widely felt, only when the hopes attention the Enlightenment came at length to be seen equally naive or fantastic, did the fine art of rhetoric begin its render to the scene, in the university if not in the public foursquare. The postmodern era, in other words, has witnessed the return of rhetoric, not as the necessary supplement to reason, but as its necessary substitute. Stale or moribund programs in rhetoric began to buzz anew. Co-ordinate to Stanley Fish, deconstructive or poststructuralist thought is supremely rhetorical because it systematically asserts and demonstrates the mediated, constructed, fractional, socially constituted nature of all realities, exist they astounding, linguistic, or psychological. ¹¹ When at that place is no text, but interpretation, when at that place is no objective truth to strive to find, all becomes the hegemony of this or that discourse, which tin can be distinguished by its persuasive power merely not past its access to the truth. And rhetoric became the academic study of those discourses. The new interest in rhetoric, so, is but the flip side of the demise of reason in some quarters of the academy. Consider in this regard the prevalence, even in ordinary conversation, of narrative: every important political event, for instance, will exist greeted past competing narratives, that is, explanations, all of which may wish to be regarded as true but which practice not seriously regard themselves as truthful.

This alliance between rhetoric and farthermost relativism had an counterpart in artifact. If sophistry and rhetoric are, strictly speaking, separate things, they were with good reason often paired.¹² For sophists were admired or condemned for their ability to speak wisely or cleverly, that is, with the skill of a consummate rhetorician. If non all rhetoricians were sophists (consider Plato, Meno 95b9–c4), so all sophists could all the same be assumed to exist rhetoricians. At any charge per unit, the greatest of the ancient sophists, Protagoras, prided himself on the brilliance of his speech, with its ready admission to revamped myths, poesy made to serve his own ends, and other cloaks or protective measures—including in his case a ballyhooed frankness (Plato, Protagoras 317b3–c1; 316d6). All of these devices together revealed a remarkable dexterity in voice communication even as they concealed enough for prophylactic's sake. According to Aristotle, Protagoras went so far equally to profess that he could brand the weaker statement the stronger, which amounts to saying that he claimed he could, through clever voice communication, make the unjust crusade triumph over the just. Aristotle adds: Hence human beings were justly disgusted by what Protagoras professed (Art of Rhetoric 1402a22–27).

Information technology is inappreciably a surprise, so, that rhetoric had its critics from early on, the most impressive of them beingness Plato'south Socrates. In the Gorgias, Plato has Socrates event a stinging rebuke of rhetoric. There he denies that it is an fine art at all, a torso of knowledge (technē), only calls it instead a knack, built-in of trial-and-fault experience, whose chief purpose is to persuade by mode of flattery as distinguished from instruction. Even so this tough criticism must be balanced against the following facts: Socrates was himself a master rhetorician, capable of doing what he liked with all his interlocutors;¹³ in the very dialogue in which he excoriates rhetoric, or a kind of rhetoric, he is shown to be eagerly seeking out the company of Gorgias, the most famous teacher of rhetoric, in order to larn from him the power of the homo'south art (Gorgias 447c1–ii); and Plato'due south ain astonishing powers of persuasion helped transform the reputation of Socrates and therewith of philosophy over the millennia. But above all, it was Plato's Socrates who taught the inadmissibility of the sun'south light into the Cave and hence the permanent ground of the need for rhetoric (consider in this regard Plato, Republic 498c9–d1 besides every bit 450a5–six).

Notwithstanding, Plato or his Socrates was willing to let stand the more visible criticism of rhetoric, which amounts to the charge that the very neat power exercised by rhetoric over human beings is too easily separable from decent ends, be they political or philosophic. In this way Plato staked out a middle ground between the sophist'southward eager embrace of rhetoric, on the one mitt, and a besides simple rejection of rhetoric, on the other. If today nosotros observe, in the contemporary heirs of Protagoras, a peachy interest in a rhetoric that is shorn of the serious concern for truth or that is dogmatically convinced of the socially constituted nature of all realities, where is to be constitute a sounder rhetoric? Where is to be constitute a rhetoric that is both guided past a longing for the truth and elevated by cognition of the noble things and the just things that politics at its best can attain (Nicomachean Ideals 1094b15)?

It is my hope that the present edition of Aristotle's inquiry into rhetoric will help revive in our fourth dimension a rhetoric both powerful and decent, dedicated in function to the sober governance of democratic republics.

◉ ◉ ◉

This translation of the Art of Rhetoric strives to be every bit literal as English usage allows. The advantages—and the limitations—of literal translation demand not be rehearsed in detail here, for by now they accept been set along many times, including by the present translator. I hope it will be enough to say that literal translations permit those without a reading cognition of the original language the best possible access to the original text; William of Moerbeke's faithful renderings of Aristotle into Latin can serve as a model in this regard. I have attempted to render consistently all key terms by what seemed to me the closest English equivalents, resorting to explanatory footnotes when the demands of idiom or intelligibility made such consistency impossible. Readers may therefore be confident that when nature appears in the translation, for example, it is reflecting the presence of the same Greek word or family unit of words (physis, phyō) in the original. It should become without saying that the identification of central terms and the selection of their English counterparts depend in the stop on the translator'southward interpretation of Aristotle or on an understanding of his intention. The outlines of my understanding of that intention are constitute in the interpretive essay, and the choice of primal words and their equivalents are recorded in the list of Greek terms and in the glossary.

The translation is based on the critical edition of the Greek text edited by Rudolf Kassel: Aristotelis Ars rhetorica (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976). I accept too consulted earlier editions of the Greek, including that of W. D. Ross (Aristotelis Ars rhetorica, Oxford Classical Texts [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959]) and the classic three-volume edition and commentary of E. M. Cope, originally published in 1877 and completed after Cope'south death past J. E. Sandys (The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary [Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2009]). Every bit readers will encounter from the notes, I had abiding recourse to the masterful, 2-book commentary of William One thousand. A. Grimaldi, S.J.: Aristotle, Rhetoric I (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980) and Aristotle, Rhetoric II (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988). It is regrettable indeed that Fr. Grimaldi did not live to write on the 3rd and final book of the Art of Rhetoric.

Two of the difficulties attending the translation of the Rhetoric deserve mention at the outset. First, the well-known terseness or elliptical character of Aristotle's Greek is very much on brandish here, and this characteristic places a special demand on translators when they attempt to traverse the distance from the Lyceum to the modern classroom. Where the grammer or meaning of the Greek clearly implies a given noun, verb, or phrase, I have supplied it without cluttering the translation with square brackets. I have instead used such brackets to indicate words or phrases that in my view are required for sense but that are to a greater degree open up to interpretation; on a few occasions such brackets contain an culling translation that helps convey the nuance of a term.

Second, it and then happens that two Greek words—logos and pistis—are central to the argument of the Rhetoric but impossible to convey past a single English language term. Logos means in the first place spoken language, the articulate sounds that human beings by nature make. It can by extension refer to a speech, an address or oration, also equally an statement, be it sound or unsound, spoken or written. (In specialized contexts, logos tin besides exist translated every bit definition, ratio, or, in book 3 of the Rhetoric, fable.) Pistis is related to the verb pisteuein, meaning to trust in, to take faith (in something or someone, including a god), to find credible. In the context of a give-and-take of rhetoric, pistis is both the means to prompt such a conviction—a proof or (every bit I prefer to interpret it) mode of persuasion—and the state of mind so prompted—a conviction that something is so. Appropriately, in its adjectival form, the word indicates that something is apparent. It hardly needs to be added that what is credible may not ever be truthful, just as what is true may non always be credible (consider Fine art of Rhetoric 1397a17–xix).

All dates in the notes are BCE, except of course in references to modern scholarly works.

I am grateful to Matthew Baldwin, Kaishuo Chen, Timothy McCranor, and William Twomey for their able help in the grooming of the manuscript. Bradley Van Uden deserves special thanks for his work on the general alphabetize. I take this opportunity to express my thanks also to the Behrakis family, whose dedication to preserving and promoting the legacy of Hellenic civilisation, and whose philanthropic generosity, have made it possible for me to hold the Behrakis Professorship in Hellenic Political Studies at Boston College. I am grateful to them, and to my colleagues at Boston College.

R. C. B.

i · Cicero (De oratore 1.20.91 and Brutus 46) traces the origin of the fine art of rhetoric to Corax and Tisias of Syracuse.

2 · What can that large number of debaters contribute to policy with their inept views only a nuisance? Thomas Hobbes, De Cive x.10. Consider also: "And though they [orators] reason, yet take they non their rise from true principles, merely from vulgar received opinions, which for the virtually function are erroneous. Neither endeavor they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their minds to whom they speak; when information technology happens, that opinions are delivered not by right reason, just by a sure violence of heed. Nor is this the fault in the man, just in the nature of eloquence, whose end, equally all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is not truth (except by run a risk), but victory; and whose property is non to inform, but to attraction." De Cive 10.eleven (emphasis original); consider besides Hobbes'southward dissimilarity betwixt logic and rhetoric at 12.12.

3 · A classic account of the history of rhetoric is George Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton Academy Press, 1994), which covers the flow before 400 BCE through to Boethius, i.east., the early on sixth century CE. Consider also James A. Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013). See too Paul D. Brandes, A History of Aristotle'south Rhetoric: With a Bibliography of Early on Printings (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989).

4 · Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 46.13 and 46.xi.

5 · Co-ordinate to John Aubrey, Hobbes judged Aristotle to be the worst instructor that ever was, the worst polititian and ethick—with the important qualification that his rhetorique and soapbox of animals was rare. John Aubrey, Brief Lives, ed. Andrew Clark (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), ane:357.

6 · "It would be difficult to observe another classical work whose importance for Hobbes's political philosophy tin be compared with that of the Rhetoric. The key chapters of Hobbes'south anthropology . . . betray in style and contents that their author was a zealous reader, non to say disciple of the Rhetoric." Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952 [originally published 1936]), 35.

7 · Preface, in English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1840), half dozen:422. Run across too John T. Harwood, ed., The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Printing, 1986).

8 · On Hobbes's attack on rhetoric, which (to repeat) included the use of a rhetoric all his own, consider Bryan Garsten's indispensable account in Saving Persuasion: A Defense force of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Academy Press, 2006), chap. 1; meet also David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1996); and Ioannis Evrigenis, Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes's State of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

9 · Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Police force, Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (London: Frank Cass, 1969) two.2.

ten · For an analysis of the reject of rhetoric in the modern period, see again Garsten, Saving Persuasion.

11 · Stanley Fish, Rhetoric, in Rhetoric in an Antifoundational World: Language, Civilization, Pedagogy, ed. Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard R. Glejzer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 53.

12 · For a argument of both the separation and the pairing, consider Plato, Gorgias 465c and context.

13 · Consider Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.ii.14.

OVERVIEW OF THE ART OF RHETORIC

A. What is rhetoric?

1. Rhetoric, dialectic, and politics: 1.1–three

B. The field of study matters of rhetoric and its source materials (specific topics)

ane. Deliberative rhetoric: 1.4–8

2. Epideictic rhetoric: 1.9

three. Judicial rhetoric: 1.x–15

C. The modes of persuasion (pisteis)

1. Passion (pathos): 2.i–11

2. Grapheme (ēthos): 2.12–17

iii. The logos and what is common to all rhetoric: ii.eighteen–26

D. Wording: 3.1–12

E. The arrangement of the parts of a spoken communication: 3.13–19

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Editions of the Greek Text and English Translations

Bekker, Immanuel, ed. Aristotelis Opera. 5 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960. Facsimile of the 1831 ed.

Buckley, Theodore, ed. and trans. Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995. Originally published 1906.

Cooper, Lane, ed. and trans. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. New York: D. Appleton, 1932.

Cope, Due east. M., ed. The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary. Rev. and ed. J. Eastward. Sandys. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2009. Originally published 1877.

Dufour, M., ed. and trans. Aristote, Rhétorique. 2 vols. Budé. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1932–38.

Dufour, Grand., and André Wartelle, ed. and trans. Aristote, Rhétorique. Vol. three. Budé. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973.

Freese, John Henry, ed. and trans. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926.

Jebb, R., and J. E. Sandys, eds. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1909.

Kassel, Rudolf, ed. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976.

Kennedy, George, ed. and trans. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Lawson-Tancred, H. C., trans. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric. New York: Penguin, 1991.

Roberts, W. Rhys, ed. and trans. Aristotle, Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Originally published 1924.

Roemer, Adolphus, ed. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Teubner, 1923.

Ross, W. D., ed. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.

Sachs, Joe, ed. and trans. Plato, Gorgias, and Aristotle, Rhetoric. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2009.

Spengel, Fifty., ed. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. 2 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1867.

Victorius. Petri Victorii Commentarii in tres libros Aristotelis De arte dicendi. Florence, 1548.

Other Works

Arnhart, Larry. Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the Rhetoric. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981.

Aubrey, John. Brief Lives. Ed. Andrew Clark. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.

Averroes. Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique. Ed. and trans. Maroun Aouad. three vols. Paris: J. Vrin, 2002.

———. 3 Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics. Ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth. Albany: SUNY Press, 1977.

Bitzer, Lloyd F. Aristotle'south Enthymeme Revisited. Quarterly Journal of Speech 45.4 (1959): 399–408.

Braet, Antoine. "The Enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric: From Argumentation Theory to Logic." Breezy Logic 19.2–3 (1999): 101–17.

Brandes, Paul D. A History of Aristotle'south Rhetoric: With a Bibliography of Early on Printings. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Printing, 1989.

Conley, Thomas Grand. The Enthymeme in Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Speech 70.2 (1984): 168–87.

Cope, Eastward. K. An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric. London: Macmillan, 1867.

———. On the Sophistical Rhetoric. Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology 2.5 (1855): 129–68.

———. On the Sophistical Rhetoric. Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology 3.nine (1856): 253–88.

Enos, Richard Leo, and Lois Peters Agnew, eds. Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998.

Evrigenis, Ioannis. Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Scientific discipline in Hobbes's State of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Ezzaher, Lahcen Elyazghi. Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle'due south Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2015.

Fish, Stanley. Rhetoric. In Rhetoric in an Antifoundational World: Linguistic communication, Culture, Pedagogy. Ed. Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard R. Glejzer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Furley, David, and Alexander Nehemas, eds. Aristotle'south Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Garsten, Bryan. Saving Persuasion: A Defense force of Rhetoric and Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Garver, Eugene. Aristotle'southward Rhetoric: An Art of Character. Chicago: Academy of Chicago Printing, 1995.

Grimaldi, William Grand. A. Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary. New York: Fordham University Printing, 1980.

———. Aristotle, Rhetoric II: A Commentary. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988.

———. Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972.

Gross, Alan G., and Arthur E. Walzer, eds. Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Printing. 2000.

Habinek, Thomas. Ancient Rhetoric: From Aristotle to Philostratus. London: Penguin, 2018.

Harwood, John T., ed. The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.

Hegel, M. Due west. F. Hegel'south Philosophy of Mind: Role Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Trans. William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Heidegger, Martin. Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana Academy Press, 2009.

———. Being and Fourth dimension. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY Press, 2010.

Herrick, James A. The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction. 5th ed. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Hobbes, Thomas. Aristotle'due south Treatise on Rhetoric. Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1833.

———. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Ed. Ferdinand Tönnies. London: Frank Cass, 1969.

———. English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Ed. William Molesworth. London: John Bohn, 1840.

———. On the Citizen [De Cive]. Ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Johnston, David. The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Kassel, Rudolf. Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971.

Kennedy, George. A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton Academy Press, 1994.

Lord, Carnes. The Intention of Aristotle'south 'Rhetoric.' Hermes 109.iii (1981): 326–39.

Perry, Ben Edwin. Aesopica. Urbana: University of Illinois Printing, 1952.

Plescia, Joseph. The Oath and Perjury in Aboriginal Greece. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1970.

Radt, Stefan L. "Zu Aristoteles Rhetorik." Mnemosyne 32 (1979): 284–306.

Rainold, John. John Rainold'due south Oxford Lectures on Aristotle'southward Rhetoric. Ed. Lawrence D. Dark-green. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Printing, 1986.

Raphael, Sally. "Rhetoric, Dialectic, and Syllogistic Argument: Aristotle's Position in Rhetoric I–II." Phronesis 19.2 (1974): 153–67.

Rapp, Christof. Aristoteles, Rhetorik. Translation, introduction, and commentary. 2 vols. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002.

Roberts, W. Rhys. Notes on Aristotle's 'Rhetoric.' American Journal of Philology 45.4 (1924): 351–61.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, ed. Essays on Aristotle'southward Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Printing, 1996.

Ross, Due west. D. Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.

Skinner, Quentin. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Strauss, Leo. On Natural Law. In Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, 137–46. Chicago: University of Chicago Printing, 1983.

———. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Footing and Genesis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. Originally published 1936.

Wartelle, André. Lexique de la Rhétorique d'Aristote. Budé. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARISTOTLE'S

ART OF RHETORIC

◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉ ◉

Outline of Book i

A. What is rhetoric?

i. Rhetoric, dialectic, and politics: 1.1–3

a) Rhetoric and dialectic: 1.1

b) Technical writers and the misuse of rhetoric

c) Utility of rhetoric

d) Rhetoric defined: 1.2

e) Modes of persuasion (pisteis)

f) Rhetoric and politics

g) Example, enthymeme, and sign, both necessary and not-necessary

2. Kinds of rhetoric: ane.three

a) Deliberative

b) Judicial

c) Epideictic

B. The subject matters of rhetoric and its source materials (specific topics)

1. Deliberative rhetoric: 1.4–eight

a) Communication regarding good and bad things: 1.4

b) The five political subjects

c) Happiness and its parts: i.5

d) The good as the advantageous, both agreed on and disputed: 1.6

e) The greater good and the more than advantageous: 1.7

f) Regimes and what is advantageous to each: 1.8

2. Epideictic rhetoric: ane.9

a) What is noble?

b) Praise and blame

c) Praise and communication

d) Amplification

3. Judicial rhetoric: 1.x–xv

a) Injustice defined: one.10

b) Causes of injustice

c) Pleasure as a motive for injustice: i.xi

d) Dispositions of the unjust: 1.12

e) Victims of injustice

f) Unjust and only acts relative to written and unwritten laws: i.13

g) Disinterestedness

h) Greater and bottom injustices: i.14

i) Non-technical modes of persuasion in trials: ane.15

(1) Laws

(2) Witnesses

(3) Compacts

(4) Evidence gained past torture

(5) Oaths

Volume ane

Affiliate 1

[1354a1] Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic.¹ For both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with those sorts of things that are in a way commonly available to the cognizance of quite all people and that practise not belong to a singled-out science. Hence all people practise in a way share in both rhetoric and dialectic, for anybody to some extent attempts[5] both to scrutinize an argument and to maintain one, and to speak in both self-defence and accusation. Now, some among the many² do these things at random, others through a certain facility stemming from a characteristic addiction.³ But since both ways are possible, information technology is clear that it would exist possible besides to carry out these things past means of a method. For it is possible to[ten] reverberate on the cause of the fact that some hit the mark as they do through a sure facility, while others do then by blow, and all would surely agree that such reflection is the task of an art.

As things stand up, those who have equanimous arts of speeches have written of⁴ only a small role of it,⁵ for only modes of persuasion⁶ are a technical affair (the rest being [but] supplementary); but about enthymemes,⁷ which are in fact[15] the body of a mode of persuasion, they say nothing, whereas they concern themselves to the greatest extent with what is extraneous to the matter at hand. For slander and compassion and acrimony, and such passions of the soul, do not pertain to that matter but chronicle rather to the juror.⁸ As a result, if all judgments were rendered as they are now in some cities, at least,[twenty] and in the well-governed ones specially, [authors of technical treatises] would take nothing whatever to say. For quite all people suppose that the laws should make such declarations, only some fifty-fifty put the laws to use, and and then forbid speaking about anything inapplicable to the matter at manus, just as in the Areopagus⁹—their belief about this being correct. For i must non warp the juror by inducing anger in him[25] or envy or pity: this would be just as if someone should make crooked the measuring stick he is about to employ.

Further, information technology is manifest that it belongs to the litigant to establish only that the matter at issue is or is not so, or did or did not happen. Only whether the thing is slap-up or small [in importance], or only or unjust—in all such cases as the legislator did non offer a articulate definition,[xxx] it is surely the case that the juror himself must form a judgment and not be instructed past the litigants. It is particularly appropriate, then, for correctly posited laws to ascertain all those things that admit of being defined and to leave the fewest possible matters for the judges. This is so, start, because it is easier to find one person or a few people, rather than many, who[1354b] are prudent and able to legislate and adjudicate. Second, acts of legislation arise from examinations conducted over a long time, whereas judgments are offered on the spot, and the result of this is that it is hard for judges to assign what is just and what is advantageous in a noble style.[5] But the greatest consideration of all is that the legislator'south judgment is not fractional but instead concerns futurity events and is universal, whereas the assemblyman and the juror judge matters that are at hand correct now and are definite. In their cases, friendly feeling and hatred and private advantage have often intervened,[x] such that it is no longer possible to contemplate what is true in an acceptable way. Instead, individual pleasure or hurting clouds their judgment. As for the other considerations, just as we are maxim, 1 should make the estimate¹⁰ authoritative over the fewest of them as possible; but as to whether something has happened or has not happened, or will or will not exist, or is or is non and then, this is necessarily[15] left to the judges: it is impossible for the legislator to foresee these things.

If, so, these things are and then, it is manifest that all those technical writers who define other matters treat what is extraneous to the field of study—for example, what the preface¹¹ and narration [of a speech communication] should contain, and each of the other parts of it, for they exercise not business concern themselves[20] in this with anything other than how to brand the judge be of a certain sort—but near the technical modes of persuasion they plant null. Yet it is from just this that someone could go skilled in enthymemes. It is for this reason that, although the same method pertains to both speaking in the public associates¹² and judicial speech,¹³ and although what concerns speaking in the assembly is nobler and more characteristic of a denizen¹⁴[25] than what concerns private transactions, about speaking in the public associates [the technical writers] say nothing, whereas when it comes to pleading a case in court, all endeavor to write in a technical way. This is so because, when one speaks in the assembly, it is less to the purpose to speak about things inapplicable to the subject; and speaking in the associates is less pernicious than judicial speech considering information technology deals to a greater degree with common concerns.¹⁵ For in the political associates the estimate judges about his own affairs,[30] and so that nothing else is needed than to demonstrate that what the counselor contends is so. But in judicial matters this is not sufficient; rather, it is to the purpose at manus to win over the listener. For here the judgment concerns the affairs of others, and so that, while they examine them in relation to their own concerns and listen for their own please,¹⁶ they requite themselves over to the litigants but do not really guess.[1355a] Hence in many places, just as we said before, the law forbids speaking outside the matter in question. Simply in the associates the judges themselves keep an adequate watch over this.

Since information technology is manifest that the technical method is concerned with modes of persuasion; and the[5] mode of persuasion is a demonstration of a sort (for we give credence to¹⁷ something especially when we suppose it to have been demonstrated); and a rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme (and this is simply authoritative, so to speak, amongst the modes of persuasion); and the enthymeme is a certain sort of syllogism¹⁸ (it belongs to dialectic, either to the whole of dialectic or to some role of it, to run across what concerns every syllogism alike),[10] information technology is clear that he who is specially able to reflect on this—from what things and how a syllogism comes to exist—would also exist specially skilled at enthymemes, because he has at his disposal the sorts of things the enthymeme is concerned with and the respects in which it differs from logical syllogisms. For it belongs to the same[15] capacity to see both what is truthful and what resembles the truth; at the same fourth dimension, homo beings have a natural competency when it comes to what is true, and for the well-nigh role they do hit upon the truth. Hence being able to aim at¹⁹ the generally accepted opinions²⁰ belongs to one who is similarly skilled besides as regards the truth.

That the others, and then, write in a technical mode about matters extraneous to the discipline, and why they have[xx] inclined more toward the pleading of judicial cases, is manifest.

Simply rhetoric is useful considering what is true and what is just are past nature superior to²¹ their opposites, such that, if the judgments [rendered in a given instance] exercise non accord with what is proper, it is necessarily the example that they are defeated on account of their opposites [i.e., by falsehood and injustice].²² And this is deserving of censure.

Farther, in the case of some people, not even if we should have[25] the most precise scientific discipline²³ would it exist an like shooting fish in a barrel thing to persuade them past speaking on the basis of it. For an argument that accords with science [amounts to] education, but this is impossible [in their instance]; information technology is necessary, rather, to mode modes of persuasion and speeches through commonly available things, just every bit we were proverb also in the Topics concerning engagement with the many.²⁴

And, further, i must be able to persuade others of opposites,[30] just as is the case too with syllogisms, not so that nosotros may practice both—for i must not persuade others of base of operations things—merely so that information technology not escape our observe how the matter stands and how, when someone else uses arguments unjustly, nosotros ourselves may be able to counter them. Now, none of the other arts forms syllogisms of opposites:[35] dialectic and rhetoric lone do this, for both are similarly concerned with opposites. Notwithstanding the underlying subject matters are not like; instead, what is true and what is better by nature are always more than readily established by syllogistic reasoning and are more persuasive, to put it just.

In addition to these considerations, information technology is strange if it is a shameful thing non to be able to come up to one's ain aid[1355b] with one'southward trunk merely non a shameful thing to exist unable to exercise so by means of statement, which is to a greater degree a human being's own than is the utilise of the body. And if someone using such a capacity of argument should do keen harm, this, at least, is common to all good things—except virtue—and peculiarly so in the case[5] of the most useful things, such as strength, health, wealth, [and] generalship. For someone using these things justly would perform the greatest benefits—and unjustly, the greatest harm.

That rhetoric, then, does non belong to some ane, definite subject affair, merely is in this respect like dialectic, and that information technology is useful, are manifest. Manifest, too,[10] is the fact that its task is not to persuade but rather to see the persuasive points that are available in each case, merely as in all the other arts equally well. For it does not belong to medicine to produce health but rather to advance health to the extent that a given instance admits of it: fifty-fifty in the example of those unable to attain wellness, it is nonetheless possible to treat them in a fine manner.

[15] In addition to these points, it is manifest also that it belongs to the same fine art [i.due east., rhetoric] to see both what is persuasive and what appears to be

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Source: https://www.scribd.com/book/403702921/Aristotle-s-Art-of-Rhetoric

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